		SRI,	, ISS, and UUA - 2017 Guidelines
Торіс		SRI Vote Recommendation	ISS Vote Recommendation
Board of Directors			
Uncontested Election of Directors		Votes on individual director nominees are made on a case-by-case basis.	Case-by-case
1a-1. Board Accountability	1a-1(a). Problematic Takeover Defenses	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered on a case-by-case basis) if: -there are problematic governance issues at the board	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		-the company's poison pill has a "dead-hand" or "modified dead- hand" feature, vote against/withhold every year until this feature is removed.	Same as SRI
		-the board adopts a long-term pill, renews an existing pill including any "short- term pill" without shareholder approval.	
		-the board makes adverse material change to an existing poison pill without shareholder approval.	
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on all nominees adopts a short-term pill with a term of without shareholder approval.	Same as SRI
	1a-1(b). Problematic Audit Related Practices	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from Audit Committee members if: - More than 50 percent of the total fees paid to the auditor is attributable to non-audit work. - The company receives an adverse opinion on the company's financial	Same as SRI
		statements form the auditor. - The company entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor.	
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on members of the Audit Committee and/or the full board if poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as; fraud, misapplication of GAAP, and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures.	Same as SRI
	1a-1(c). Problematic Compensation Practices/Pay-for- Performance Misalignment	In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation ballot item, or, in egregious situations, vote <b>against/withhold</b> from the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if: - There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance.	
		- The company has problematic pay practices including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.	Same as SRI
		-The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders -The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration -The company fails to submit one-time transfers of stock options to a shareholder vote. -The company fails to fulfill the terms of a burn rate commitment made to shareholders.	

	<ul> <li>Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Management Say-on Pay Proposal if the company's previous say-on-pay proposal received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:</li> <li>-The company's response, including: (a) disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support; (b) specific actions taken to address the issues that contributed to the low level of support; (c) other recent compensation actions taken by the company.</li> <li>Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated</li> <li>-The company's ownership structure</li> <li>Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness</li> </ul>	Same as SRI
1a-1(d). Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Failures	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board due to:	Vote against/withhold from directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board due to:
	-material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks. The SRI and Sustainability Policies incorporate additional criteria to evaluate risk oversight. Specifically, the ISS the policies' approaches to proxy voting include employing the use of ESG risk indicators to identify moderate to severe ESG risk factors at public companies, and holding board members accountable for failure to sufficiently oversee, manage, or guard against material ESG risks at over 5000 global firms in the MSCI World Index.	-material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company,
	-failure to replace management as appropriate	-failure to replace management as appropriate
	-egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company	-egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company
1a-1(e). Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments	Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company's bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders' rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:	

<ul> <li>-The board's rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification</li> <li>-Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;</li> <li>-The level of impairment of shareholders' rights caused by the board's unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;</li> <li>-The board's track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;</li> <li>-The company's ownership structure;</li> <li>-The company's existing governance provisions;</li> <li>-The timing of the board's amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and,</li> <li>-Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.</li> <li>Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder suitable.</li> </ul>
Generally vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if: The company's charter imposes undue restrictions on shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against on an ongoing basis.

Same as SRI

Byla	1(f). Unilateral aw/Charter Amendments- Companies	For newly public companies, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company's public offering, the company or its board adopted bylaw or charter provisions materially adverse to shareholder rights, or implemented a multi- class capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights considering the following factors: • The level of impairment of shareholders' rights; • The disclosed rationale; • The ability to change the governance structure (e.g., limitations on shareholders' right to amend the bylaws or charter, or supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; • The ability of shareholders to hold directors accountable through annual director elections, or whether the company has a classified board structure; • Any reasonable sunset provision; and • Other relevant factors. Unless the adverse provision and/or problematic capital structure is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.	
		<ul> <li>Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:</li> <li>a. The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:</li> <li>-Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;</li> <li>-Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;</li> <li>-The subject matter of the proposal;</li> <li>-The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;</li> <li>-Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;</li> <li>-The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and</li> <li>-Other factors as appropriate.</li> </ul>	
1a-2. Board Responsiveness		<ul> <li>b. The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;</li> <li>c. At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote;</li> <li>d. The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the majority of votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency; or</li> </ul>	Same as SRI

	<ul> <li>e. The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency, taking into account:</li> <li>The board's rationale for selecting a frequency that is different from the frequency that received a plurality;</li> <li>The company's ownership structure and vote results;</li> <li>Social Advisory Services' analysis of whether there are compensation concerns or a history of problematic compensation practices; and</li> <li>The previous year's support level on the company's say-on-pay proposal.</li> </ul>	
	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from the entire slate of directors if the full board is less than majority independent.	Withhold from inside and affiliated directors if the full board is less than majority independent.
1a-3. Director Independence	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors if they serve on the key committees.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors if the company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committees and the full board serves the function of that committee.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against/withhold</b> from individual directors (except new nominees) who serve as members of the nominating committee and have failed to establish gender and/or racial diversity on the board. If the company does not have a formal nominating committee, vote <b>against/withhold</b> votes from the entire board of directors.	N/A
1a-4. Director Diversity/Competence	Generally vote against/withhold from directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following: medical issues/illness; family engagements; and if the director's total service was three meeting or fewer and the director missed only one meeting. If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote <b>against/withhold</b> from the director(s) in question.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote against or withhold from individual directors who: > Sit on more than five public company boards; or > Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards.	Same as SRI
1b. Board-Related 1b-1. Classification/Declassification of the Board	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to classify (stagger) the board of directors.	Same as SRI
1b-2. Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections	Vote <b>against</b> if no carve-out for plurality in contested elections is included.	Same as SRI

1b3. Cumulative Voting	Vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting.	Generally vote agains
1b-4. Director and Officer Liability Protection	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability for: (i) a breach of the duty of care, (ii) acts or omissions not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of the law, (iii) acts involving the unlawful purchases or redemptions of stock, (iv) the payment of unlawful dividends, or (v) the receipt of improper personal benefits.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> indemnification proposals that would expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to acts, such as negligence, that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligations than mere carelessness.	Same as SRI
1b-5. Director and Officer Indemnification	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that would expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for at the discretion of the company's board (i.e., "permissive indemnification") but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> only those proposals that provide such expanded coverage in cases when a director's or officer's legal defense was unsuccessful if: (i) the director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company, and (ii) only if the director's legal expenses would be covered.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to restore shareholder ability to remove directors with or without cause.	Same as SRI
1b-6. Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that seek to fix the size of the board.	Same as SRI
1b-7. Board Size	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals that seek to change the size or range of the board.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval.	Same as SRI
1b-8. Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.	Same as SRI
1b-9. Term Limits	Vote <b>against</b> management proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through term limits. However, scrutinize boards where the average tenure of all directors exceeds 15 years for independence from management and for sufficient turnover to ensure that new perspectives are being added to the board.	Same as SRI
1b-10. Age Limits	Vote <b>against</b> management proposal to limit the tenure of outside directors through mandatory retirement ages.	Same as SRI

1c-1. Proxy Contests- Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors: (i) Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry; (ii) Management's track record; (iii) Background to the contested election; (iv) Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements; (v) Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management; (vi) Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and (vii) Stock ownership positions. In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by- case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).	Same as SRI
1c-2. Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to repeal classified (staggered) boards and to elect all directors annually.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to classify the board.	Same as SRI
1c-3. Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals	Vote <b>for</b> precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board change the company's bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.	Same as SRI
1c-4. Cumulative Voting	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to restore or permit cumulative voting.	Generally vote for.
1c-5. Majority of Independent Directors	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by Social Advisory Services' definition of independent outsider.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to strengthen the definition of independence for board directors.	Same as SRI

1c-6. Establishment of Independent Committees	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors.	Same as SRI	
1c-7. Independent Board Chair	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.	Generally vote for.	
1c-8. Establishment of Board Committees	Generally vote for shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee to address broad corporate policy topics or to provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on issues such as the environment, human or labor rights, shareholder relations, occupational health and safety, etc. when the formation of such committees appears to be a potentially effective method of protecting or enhancing shareholder value.	Case-by-case	
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.	Same as SRI	
1c-9. Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee candidate who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering: (i) The company's board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers; (ii) The company's existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; (iii) The company's disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and (iv) The scope and structure of the proposal.	Same as SRI	
1c-10. Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement	Vote <b>for</b> shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders.	Generally vote for.	
1c-11. Proxy Access	Generally vote for on shareholder proposals asking for open or proxy access.	Same as SRI	
1b-9. Term Limits	Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through term limits. However, scrutinize boards where the average tenure of all directors exceeds 15 years for independence from management and for sufficient turnover to ensure that new perspectives are being added to the board.	Same as SRI	
1c-13. Age Limits	Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through mandatory retirement ages.	Same as SRI	
1c-14. CEO Succession Planning	<b>Generally vote for</b> proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering the scope of the request and the company's existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.	Same as SRI	

	1c-15. Vote No Campaigns	In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public "vote no" campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information. Vote <b>case-by-case</b> .	Same as SRI
2. Ratification of Auditors 2a. Auditor Ratification		Vote <b>against</b> where non-audit fees exceed 25 percent of total fees paid.	Vote against where non-audit fees exceed 50 percent of total
		Vote <b>against</b> where non-addit rees exceed 25 percent of total rees paid. Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to vote on auditor ratification.	fees paid. Same as SRI
2a. Auditor-Related	2a-1. Auditor Independence	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that ask a company to adopt a policy on auditor independence.	Case-by-case
Shareholder Proposals		Vote <b>for</b> proposals that seek to limit the non-audit services provided by the company's auditor.	Case-by-case
	2a-2. Auditor Rotation	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to rotate company's auditor every five years or more.	Case-by-case
3. Takeover Defenses / Sh	areholder Rights d Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals		
	3a-1. Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on management proposals on poison pill ratification. The rights plan should have the following attributes: -No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over provision; -A term of no more than three years; -No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill; -Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause): if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill; and -The rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, the company's existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns should be taken into consideration.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>against</b> proposals to adopt a poison pill for the state purpose of protecting a company's NOLs if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of 3 years and the exhaustion of the NOL.	Same as SRI
	25.2 Not Operating Loss (NOL) Paison Pills (Protection	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of 3 years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL: (i) the ownership threshold to transfer, (ii) the value of the NOLs, (iii) shareholder protection mechanisms, (iv) the company's existing governance structure, and (v) any other relevant factors.	Same as SRI
	3a-2. Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company's NOLs if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of 3 years and the exhaustion of the NOL.	Same as SRI

	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> , considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of 3 years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL: (i) the ownership threshold to transfer, (ii) the value of the NOLs, (iii) shareholder protection mechanisms, (iv) the company's existing governance strucutre, and (v) any other relevant factors.	Same as SRI
3a-3. Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.	Same as SRI
3a-3. Supermajority shareholder vote kequirements	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.	Same as SRI
3a-4. Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meeting	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account: a) shareholders' current right to call special meetings, b) minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred), c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language, d) investor ownership structure, and e) shareholder support of and management's response to previous shareholder proposals.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to call special meetings.	Same as SRI
3a-5. Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent, taking into consideration: a) shareholders' current right to act by written consent, b) consent threshold, c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language, d) Investor ownership structure, and e) shareholder support of and management's response to previous shareholder proposals.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to take action by written consent.	Same as SRI
3a-6. Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> basis on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.	Same as SRI
3a-7. Fair Price Provisions	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to adopt fair price provisions evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.	Same as SRI
	Generally, vote <b>against</b> fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.	Same as SRI
3a-8. Greenmail	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to adopt antigreenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company's ability to make greenmail payments.	Same as SRI
	Review on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis antigreenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.	Same as SRI
3a-9. Confidential Voting	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to adopt confidential voting.	Same as SRI

3a-10. Control Share Acquisition Provisions	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.	Same as SRI
Sa-10. Control share Acquisition Provisions	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.	Same as SRI
3a-11. Control Share Cash-Out Provisions	Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.	Same as SRI
3a-12. Disgorgement Provisions	Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.	Same as SRI
3a-13. State Takeover Statutes	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, antigreenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders.	Same as SRI
3a-14. Freeze-Out Provisions	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions.	Same as SRI
3a-15. Reincorporation Proposals	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis proposals to change a company's state of incorporation giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns. Reincorporations into "tax havens" will be given special consideration.	Same as SRI
3a-16. Amend Bylaws Without Shareholder Consent	Vote <b>against</b> proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.	Same as SRI
Sa-10. America byraws without shareholder consent	Vote <b>for</b> proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.	Same as SRI
3a-17. Litigation Rights	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on bylaws which impact shareholders' litigation rights, taking into account factors such as: - The company's stated rationale for adopting such a provision; - Disclosure of past harm from shareholder lawsuits in which plaintiffs were unsuccessful or shareholder lawsuits outside the jurisdiction of incorporation; - The breadth of application of the bylaw, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and - Governance features such as shareholders' ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.	Same as SRI
	<b>Generally vote against</b> bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).	

3b-1. Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: a) a shareholder approved poison pill in place, or b) the company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either: shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or the board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments.	Same as SRI
3b-2. Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.	Same as SRI
3b-3. Remove Antitakeover Provisions	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that seek to remove antitakeover provisions.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.	Same as SRI
3b-4. Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply: (i) The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election; (ii) One or more of the dissident's candidates is elected; (iii) Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; (iv) The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.	Same as SRI
4. Miscellaneous Governance Provisions		
4a. Bundled Proposals	Review on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis bundled or "conditioned" proxy proposals.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.	Same as SRI
4b. Adjourn Meeting	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes "other business."	Same as SRI
4c. Changing Corporate Name	Vote <b>for</b> changing the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely affect shareholder value.	Same as SRI
4d. Amend Quorum Requirements	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding unless there are compelling reasons to support the proposal.	Same as SRI
4e. Amend Minor Bylaws	Vote <b>for</b> bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).	Same as SRI
4f. Other Business	Generally vote against other business proposals.	Same as SRI

5. Capital Structure		
	Review on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issue, taking into account the size of the increase, the company's rationale for additional shares, the company's use of authorized shares during the last three years, and the risk to shareholders if the request is not approved. A company's need for additional shares is gauged by measuring shares outstanding and reserved as a percentage of the total number of shares currently authorized for issuance.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote against the requested increase in authorized capital on the basis of imprudent past use of shares if, within the past three years, the board adopted a poison pill without shareholder approval, repriced or exchanged underwater stock options without shareholder approval, or placed a substantial amount of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value without shareholder approval.	Same as SRI
5a. Common Stock Authorization	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals at companies with more than one class of common stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.	Same as SRI
	Review on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis all other proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issue, considering company-specific factors that include past company performance and the current request.	Same as SRI
5b. Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).	Same as SRI
5c. Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to increase common share authorization for a stock split or shared dividend, provided that the increase in authorized shares would not result in an excessive number of shares available for issuance using an allowable increase calculated by Social Advisory Services.	Same as SRI
5d. Reverse Stock Splits	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to implement a reverse stock split when the number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals when there is not a proportionate reduction of authorized shares, unless: - A stock exchange has provided notice to the company of a potential delisting; or - The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Social Advisory Services' Common Stock Authorization policy.	Same as SRI

	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to increase the number of authorized preffered shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals at companies with more than one class or series of preferred stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class or series of preferred stock that has superior voting rights.	Same as SRI
5e. Preferred Stock Authorization	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis proposals to increase the number of shares of preferred stock authorized for issuance, considering company-specific factors that include past board performance and the current request.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights ("blank check" preferred stock).	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to create "declawed" blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.	Same as SRI
5f. Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to eliminate par value.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote against dual class capital structures.	Same as SRI
5g. Unequal Voting Rights	Vote <b>for</b> dual class recapitalizations when the structure is designed to protect economic interests of investors.	Same as SRI
5h. Preemptive Rights	Review on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights taking into consideration the size of the company, the characteristics of its shareholder base, and the liquidity of the stock.	Same as SRI
El Dala Bastandarian	Review on a case-by-case basis proposals regarding debt restructurings.	Same as SRI
Si. Debt Restructurings	Vote <b>for</b> the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.	Same as SRI
5j. Share Repurchase Programs	Vote <b>for</b> management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms.	Same as SRI
5k. Conversion of Securities	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals regarding conversion of securities, taking into account the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.	Same as SRI

	Vote <b>for</b> the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.	Same as SRI
5I. Recapitalization	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account whether capital structure is simplified, liquidity is enhanced, fairness of conversion terms, impact on voting power and dividends, reasons for the reclassification, conflicts of interest, and other alternatives considered.	Same as SRI
5m. Tracking Stock	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as: adverse governance changes, excessive increases in authorized capital stock, unfair method of distribution, diminution of voting rights, adverse conversion features, negative impact on stock option plans, and alternatives such as spin-offs.	Same as SRI
6. Executive and Director Compensation		
6a.Executive Pay	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis management proposals seeking advisory votes on executive compensation	Case-by-case
6a-1. Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation - Management	Vote <b>against</b> management say on pay proposals where there is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance; the company maintains problematic pay practices; the board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders or if the board has failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices.	Vote <b>against</b> management say on pay proposals where there is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance; the company maintains problematic pay practices; the board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders or if the board has failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices.
Say-on-Pay Proposals	Vote <b>against</b> an equity plan on the ballot if pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO's misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration: - Magnitude of pay misalignment; - Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and - The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.	Same as SRI
6a-2. Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation - Management Say-on-Pay	Vote for <b>annua</b> l advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.	Same as SRI
6a-3. Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on equity-based compensation plans depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where postive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated in three pillars:	
	(i) <b>Plan Cost</b> : The total estimated cost of the company's equity plans relative	

6a-4. Equity-Based Incentive Plans	<ul> <li>to industry/market cap peers, measured</li> <li>by the company's estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:</li> <li>SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and</li> <li>SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.</li> <li>(ii) Plan Features:</li> <li>&gt;Automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control (CIC);</li> <li>&gt; Discretionary vesting authority;</li> <li>&gt; Liberal share recycling on various award types;</li> <li>&gt; Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;</li> <li>&gt; Dividends payable prior to award vesting.</li> <li>(iii) Grant Practices:</li> <li>The company's three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;</li> <li>&gt; Vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (3-year look-back);</li> <li>&gt; The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares</li> <li>requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);</li> <li>&gt; The proportion of the CEO's most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;</li> <li>&gt; Whether the company maintains a claw-back policy;</li> <li>&gt; Whether the company has established post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.</li> </ul>	Same as SRI
6b. Other Compensation Plans	<ul> <li>Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders' interests, or if any of the following apply:</li> <li>-Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;</li> <li>-The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);</li> <li>-The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a pay-for-performance disconnect; or</li> <li>-Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.</li> </ul>	Same as SRI

	Generally vote for proposals to approve or amend executive incentive bonus plans if the proposal: >Addresses administrative features only; or > Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent outsiders, per Social Advisory Services' Categorization of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company's initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).	Same as SRI
6b-1. Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))	<ul> <li>Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:</li> <li>If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.</li> <li>If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time after the company's IPO, whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.</li> <li>If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impacts of the overall impact of the amendments.</li> </ul>	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company's IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal: > Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent outsiders, per Social Advisory Services' Categorization of Directors.	Same as SRI
6h-7(2) Qualified Plans	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote <b>for</b> employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply: -Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value; -Offering period is 27 months or less; and -The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares.	Same as SRI

6b-2. Employee Stock Purchase	עשיבנסן. עעמווווכע רומוזס	Vote <b>against</b> qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply: -Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or -Offering period is greater than 27 months; or -The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares.	Same as SRI
Plans (ESPPs)	6b-2(b). Non-Qualified Plans	Vote <b>for</b> nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features: -Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company); -Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary; -Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee's contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and -No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.	Same as SRI
6b-3. Employee Stock Ownership Pla	ins (ESOPs)	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).	Same as SRI
6b-4. Option Exchange Programs/Re	pricing Options	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.	Same as SRI
6b-5. Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash		Vote <b>for</b> non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for- dollar cash-for-stock exchange.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model.	Same as SRI
6b-6. Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Pro	ograms	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on one-time transfers. Vote <b>for</b> if: (i) Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating; (ii) Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and (iii) There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>against</b> equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders.	Same as SRI
6b-7. 401(k) Employee Benefit Plans		Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.	Same as SRI
6b-8. Severance Agreements for Exec	cutives/Golden Parachutes	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes.	Same as SRI

6c-1. Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	<ul> <li>Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:</li> <li>If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and</li> <li>An assessment of the following qualitative factors:</li> <li>The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;</li> <li>The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;</li> <li>Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;</li> <li>Equity award vesting schedules;</li> <li>The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;</li> <li>Meaningful limits on director compensation;</li> <li>The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and</li> <li>The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.</li> </ul>	Same as SRI
	Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on: > The total estimated cost of the company's equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company's estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; > The company's three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and > The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).	Same as SRI
6c-2. Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	<ul> <li>binoccasion, director stock plans will exceed the plan cost of burn rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:</li> <li>The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;</li> <li>The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;</li> <li>Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;</li> <li>Equity award vesting schedules;</li> <li>The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;</li> <li>Meaningful limits on director compensation;</li> <li>The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and</li> </ul>	Same as SRI
6c-2. Outside Director Stock Awards / Options in Lieu of Cash	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash.	Same as SRI
6c-3. Director Retirement Plans	Vote <b>against</b> retirement plans for non-employee directors. Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non- employee directors.	Same as SRI Same as SRI
er Proposals on Compensation 6d-1. Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure on executive compensation issues including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.	Generally vote for.

	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to prepare reports seeking to compare the wages of a company's lowest paid worker to the highest paid workers.	Generally vote against.
6d-2. Limit Executive Compensation	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals that seek to establish a fixed ratio between the company's lowest paid workers and the highest paid workers.	Generally vote against.
6d-3. Stock Ownership Requirements	Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandeate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.	Same as SRI
Cd 2. Dushihik /Dequire Shoushelder Annuoval for Ontion	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking to limit repricing.	Same as SRI
6d-3. Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking the company to have option repricings submitted for shareholder ratification.	Same as SRI
6d-4. Severance Agreements/ Golden Parachutes	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prio to entering into employment contracts.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for non-discrimination in retirement benefits.	Case-by-case
6d-5. Cash Balance Plans	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking a company to give employees the option of electing to participate in either a cash balance plan or in a defined benefit plan.	Same as SRI
6d-6. Performance-Based Equity Awards	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposal requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders.	Same as SRI
6d-7. Pay for Superior Performance	Generally vote for shareholder proposals based on a case-by-case analysis that requests the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company's executive compensation plan for senior executives.	Same as SRI
6d-8. Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non- financial factors including performance against social and environmental goals, customer/employee satisfaction, corporate downsizing, community involvement, human rights, or predatory lending.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking reports on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.	Case-by-case
6d-9. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals	Generally vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.	Same as SRI

6d-10. Employment Termination Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity. The following factors will be taken into regarding this policy: (i) The company's current treatment of equity in change- of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares; and (ii) Current employment agreements, including potential problematic pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).	Same as SRI
6d-11 Tax Gross-Up Proposals	Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.	Same as SRI
6d-12. Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company's Utilization	<b>Generally vote for</b> shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the Company, Board, or Compensation Committee's use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.	Same as SRI
6d-13. Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation.	Same as SRI
6d-14.Recoup Bonuses	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error.	Same as SRI
6d-15. Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investment Policy	Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan.	Same as SRI
6d-16. Bonus Banking	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees).	Same as SRI

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	6d-17. Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors: (i) Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry; (ii) Management's track record; (iii) Background to the contested election; (iv) Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements; (v) Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management; (vii) Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and (vii) Stock ownership positions. In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).	Same as SRI
	6d-18. Non-Deductible Compensation	Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure of the extent to which the company paid non-deductible compensation to senior executives due to Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), while considering the company's existing disclosure practices.	Same as SRI
	6d-19. Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for certain principles regarding the use of prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives.	Same as SRI
7. Mergers and Corporate	Restructurings		
7a. Mergers and Acquisitio	ns	Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis. A review and evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction is conducted, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors.	Same as SRI
7b. Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization.	Same as SRI
7c. Spin-Offs		Votes on spin-offs should be considered on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, valuation of spinoff, fairness opinion, benefits to the parent company, conflicts of interest, managerial incentives, corporate governance changes, and changes in the capital structure.	Same as SRI
7d. Asset Purchases		Votes on asset purchase proposals should be made on a <b>case-by-case</b> after considering the purchase price, fairness opinion, financial and strategic benefits, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives for the business, non-completion risk.	Same as SRI
7e. Asset Sales		Votes on asset sales should be made on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, potential elimination of diseconomies, anticipated financial and operating benefits, anticipated use of funds, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, and conflicts of interest.	Same as SRI
7f. Liquidations		Votes on liquidations should be made on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis after reviewing management's efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.	Same as SRI
		Vote for the liquidation if the company will file <b>for</b> bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.	Same as SRI

7g. Joint Ventures	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account percentage of assets/business contributed, percentage ownership, financial and strategic benefits, governance structure, conflicts of interest, other alternatives, and non-completion risk.	Same as SRI
7h. Appraisal Rights	Vote <b>for</b> proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.	Same as SRI
7i. Going Private/Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-Outs)	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on "going dark" transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value.	Same as SRI
	Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements.	Same as SRI
7j. Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures	Vote <b>for</b> the private placement if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.	Same as SRI
7k. Formation of Holding Company	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the reasons for the change, any financial or tax benefits, regulatory benefits, increases in capital structure, and changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.	Same as SRI
	Vote <b>against</b> the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum, or adverse changes in shareholder rights.	Same as SRI
7I.Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, selling the company or liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.	Same as SRI
8. Social & Environmental Proposals. 8a. Diversity and Equality		
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask the company to take steps to nominate more women and racial minorities to the board.	Case-by-case
8a-1. Add Women and Minorities to Board	Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on board diversity.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt nomination charters or amend existing charters to include reasonable language addressing diversity.	Generally vote against.
8a-2. Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the distribution of stock options by race and gender of the recipient.	Case-by-case
Report on Gender Pay Gap	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to provide a report on any pay discrepancy by gender.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its diversity and/or affirmative action programs.	Generally vote for.
8a-3. Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, and labor policies and practices that effect long-term corporate performance.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting nondiscrimination in salary, wages and all benefits.	Case-by-case

		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for action on equal employment	
		opportunity and antidiscrimination.	Case-by-case
	8a-4. Report on Progress Toward Glass Ceiling Commission	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its progress against the Glass Ceiling Commission's recommendations.	Same as SRI
	Recommendations	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate the "glass ceiling" for women and minority employees.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	Generally vote for.
	8a-5. Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking reports on a company's initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	Generally vote for.
		Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate protection already afforded to gay and lesbian employees.	Same as SRI
	8a-6. Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking more careful consideration of using racial stereotypes in advertising campaigns, including preparation of a report on this issue.	Case-by-case
8b. Labor and Human Right		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or the Global Sullivan Principles.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that call for the adoption of principles or codes of conduct relating to company investments in countries with patterns of human rights abuses (e.g. Northern Ireland, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China).	Case-by-case
	8b-1. Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.	Vote against.
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that seek publication of a "Code of Conduct" to the company's foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees' wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis.	Case-by-case

		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee's wages and working conditions.	Case-by-case
8b-2. Adopt/Report on Holy Land	Principles	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to report on or implement the Holy Land Principles.	Generally vote against.
8b-3. Community Impact Assessm Rights	ent / Indigenous Peoples'	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to prepare reports on a company's environmental and health impact on communities.	Case-by-case
8b-4. Report on Risks of Outsourc	ng	Vote <b>for</b> shareholders proposals asking for companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing or off-shoring.	Case-by-case
8b-5. Report on the Impact of Hea Operations	Ith Pandemics on Company	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking for companies to report on the impact of pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, on their business strategies.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in Burma.	Case-by-case
	8b-6(a). Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking reports on Burmese operations and reports on costs of continued involvement in the country.	Case-by-case
		Vote shareholder proposals to pull out of Burma on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis.	Same as SRI
9h C. Onerstiens is Wish Bisk	8b-6(b). Reports on	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting more disclosure on a company's involvement in China.	Case-by-case
Markets	-6. Operations in High Risk	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis shareholder proposals that ask a company to terminate a project or investment in China.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposals requesting that companies cease product sales to repressive regimes that can be used to violate human rights.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> proposals to report on company efforts to reduce the likelihood of product abuses in this manner.	Case-by-case
	8b-6(d). Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security	Vote <b>for</b> resolutions requesting the disclosure and implementation of Internet privacy and censorship policies and procedures.	Case-by-case
8b-7. Disclosure on Plant Closings		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on plant closing criteria if the company has not provided such information.	Vote against.
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company's environmental practices, and/or environmental risks and liabilities.	Generally vote for.
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).	Generally vote for.
8c-1. Environmental/Sustainabilit	y Reports	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to prepare a sustainability report.	Generally vote for.

	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to study or implement the CERES principles.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking disclosure of liabilities or preparation of a report pertaining to global warming and climate change risks, such as financial, physical, or regulatory risks.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG or adoption of GHG goals in products and operations.	Case-by-case
8c-2. Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas emissions from company operations and/or products.	Generally vote for.
8c-3. Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company's activities related to the development of renewable energy sources.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive.	Generally vote against.
8c-4. Energy Efficiency	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting a report on company energy efficiency policies and/or goals.	Generally vote for.
8c-5. Operations in Protected/Sensitive Areas	Vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to prepare a feasibility report or to adopt a policy not to mine, drill, or log in environmentally sensitive areas.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking to prohibit or reduce the sale of products manufactured from materials extracted from environmentally sensitive areas such as old growth forests.	Case-by-case
8c-6. Hydraulic Fracturing	Vote <b>for</b> requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.	Generally vote for.
8c-7. Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to prepare a report on the phase-out of chlorine bleaching in paper production.	Case-by-case
des rinnase out enforme based chemicals	Vote on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis on shareholder proposals asking companies to cease or phase-out the use of chlorine bleaching.	Case-by-case
8c-8. Land Procurement and Development	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for land procurement and utilize the policies in their decision-making.	Generally vote against.
8c-9. Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)	Vote <b>for</b> requests that companies report on the sustainability and the environmental impacts of both company-owned and contract livestock operations.	Generally vote for.
8c-10. Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting the preparation of a report on the company's recycling efforts.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.	Case-by-case

		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company's nuclear energy procedures.	Generally vote against.
	8c-11. Nuclear Energy	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals that ask the company to cease the production of nuclear power.	Generally vote against.
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company's risks linked to water use.	Case-by-case
	8c-12. Water Use	Vote <b>for</b> resolutions requesting companies to promote the "human right to water" as articulated by the United Nations.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for water use that incorporate social and environmental factors.	Case-by-case
	8c-13. Kyoto Protocol Compliance	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on how companies will meet GHG reduction targets of the Kyoto-compliant countries in which they operate.	Generally vote for.
8d. Health and Safety		Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on policies and	
		activities to ensure product safety.	Generally vote for.
	8d-1. Toxic Materials	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose annual expenditures relating to the promotion and/or environmental cleanup of toxins.	Case-by-case
		Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing, or substituting with safer alternatives, all "harmful" ingredients used in company products.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling on the company to establish a plan to reduce toxic emissions.	Case-by-case
		Generally vote for proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives.	Generally vote for.
	8d-2. Product Safety	Generally vote for proposals requesting the study, adoption and/or implementation of consumer product safety programs in the company's supply chain.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.	Case-by-case
	8d-3. Workplace/Facility Safety	Vote shareholder proposals requesting companies report on or implement procedures associated with their operations and/or facilities on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis.	Case-by-case
	8d-4. Report on Handgun Safety Initiatives	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking the company to report on its efforts to promote handgun safety.	Case-by-case
	ou-4. Report on nanugun salety initiatives	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking the company to stop the sale of handguns and accessories.	Generally vote against.
	8d-5. Ride Safety	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> shareholder proposals to report on ride safety.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products or products from cloned animals.	Generally vote against.
	9d E. Dhace Out or Label Droducts Containing Consticully	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask the company to phase out the use of genetically engineered ingredients in their products.	Generally vote against.

Engineered Ingredients	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on the use of genetically engineered organisms in their products.	Generally vote for proposals seeking a report.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking for reports on the financial, legal, and operational risks posed by the use of genetically engineered organisms.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to children.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking producers of tobacco product components (such as filters, adhesives, flavorings, and paper products) to halt sales to tobacco companies.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask restaurants to adopt smoke-free policies and that ask tobacco companies to support smoke-free legislation.	Generally vote against.
-	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking a report on a tobacco company's advertising approach.	Case-by-case
8d-7. Tobacco-Related Proposals	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals at insurance companies to cease investment in tobacco companies.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals at producers of cigarette components calling for a report outlining the risks and potential liabilities of the production of these components.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals calling for tobacco companies to cease the production of tobacco products.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to stop all advertising, marketing and sale of cigarettes using the terms "light," "ultra-light," "mild," and other similar words and/or colors.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to increase health warnings on cigarette smoking. (i.e.: information for pregnant women, "Canadian Style" warnings, filter safety).	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to prepare a report on drug pricing.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to adopt a formal policy on drug pricing.	Generally vote against.
8d-8. Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria drugs in third-world nations.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals asking for reports on the economic effects and legal risks of limiting pharmaceutical products to Canada or certain wholesalers.	Generally vote for.
	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> proposals requesting that companies adopt policies not to constrain prescription drug re-importation by limiting supplies to foreign markets.	Generally vote against.
8e-1. Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking a report on the renouncement of future landmine production.	Vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to report on foreign military sales or offset agreements.	Vote against.
8e-2. Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales	Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for outright restrictions on foreign military sales.	Vote against.

8e. Government and

8e-3. Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals requesting a report on involvement, policies, and procedures related to depleted uranium and nuclear weapons.	Vote against.
8e-4. Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to review and amend, if necessary, the company's code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards and execution.	Case-by-case
8f. Animal Welfare	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that seek to limit unnecessary animal testing where alternative testing methods are feasible or not barred by law.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that ask companies to adopt and/or report on company animal welfare standards or animal welfare-related risks	Generally vote for proposals seeking a report.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the operational costs and liabilities associated with selling animals.	Generally vote for proposals seeking a report.
8f-1. Animal Rights/Testing	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to eliminate cruel product testing methods.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that seek to monitor, limit, report, or eliminate outsourcing animal testing to overseas laboratories.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to publicly adopt or adhere to an animal welfare policy at both company and contracted laboratory levels.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals to evaluate, adopt or require suppliers to adopt CAK and/or CAS slaughter methods.	Generally vote against.
8g. Political and Charitable Giving		
	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on how companies utilize lobbying efforts to challenge scientific research and governmental legislation.	Case-by-case
8g-1. Lobbying Efforts	Vote <b>for</b> proposals requesting information on a company's lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals requesting information about recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company's lobbying-related activities.	Case-by-case
	Vote <b>for</b> proposals calling for a company to disclose its political and trade association contributions, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive.	Generally vote for.
8g-2. Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship	Vote <b>for</b> proposals calling for a company to maintain a policy of non- partisanship and to limit political contributions.	Generally vote against.
	Vote <b>against</b> proposals calling for a company to refrain from making any political contributions.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote for shareholder resolutions seeking enhanced transparency on corporate philanthropy.	Same as SRI
8g-3. Charitable Contributions	Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals imposing charitable giving criteria or requiring shareholder ratification of grants.	Same as SRI

		Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals requesting that companies prohibit	Case-by-case
	8g-4. Disclosure on Prior Government Service	charitable contributions. Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals calling for the disclosure of prior government	Vote against.
8h. Consumer Lending and	Economic Development	service of the company's key executives.	
on. Consumer Lending and	8h-1. Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking for disclosure on lending practices in developing countries, unless the company has demonstrated a clear proactive record on the issue.	Case-by-case
	8h-2. Disclosure on Credit in Developing Countries (LDCs) or	Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals asking banks to forgive loans outright.	Same as SRI
	Forgive LDC Debt	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposals asking for loan forgiveness at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans.	Same as SRI
		Vote <b>for</b> proposals to restructure and extend the terms of non-performing loans.	Case-by-case
	8h-3. Community Investing	Vote <b>for</b> proposals that seek a policy review or report addressing the company's community investing efforts.	Case-by-case
8i. Miscellaneous			
	8i-1. Adult Entertainment	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals that seek a review of the company's involvement with pornography.	Case-by-case
	8i-2. Abortion/Right to Life Issues	Abstain on shareholder proposals that address right to life issues.	Case-by-case
	8i-3. Coffee Crisis	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking for reports on company policies related to the coffee crisis.	Case-by-case
	8i-4. Anti-Social Proposals	Vote <b>against</b> shareholder proposals that do not seek to ultimately advance the goals of the social investment community.	Case-by-case
		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on anti-social shareholder proposals seeking a review or report on the company's charitable contributions.	Case-by-case
	8i-5. Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games	Vote <b>for</b> shareholder proposals asking for reports on company policies related to the sale of mature-rated video games to children and teens.	Case-by-case
9. Mutual Fund Proxies			
9a. Election of Trustees and	d Directors	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings.	Same as SRI
9b. Investment Advisory Ag	greement	Votes on investment advisory agreements should be evaluated on a <b>case-by-</b> <b>case</b> basis, considering the following factors: (i) Proposed and current fee schedules; (ii) Fund category/investment objective; (iii) Performance benchmarks; (iv) Share price performance as compared with peers; (v) Resulting fees relative to peers; (vi) Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).	Same as SRI
Oc. Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction		Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non- fundamental restriction, considering the following factors: (i) The fund's target investments; (ii) The reasons given by the fund for the change; and (iii) The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.	Same as SRI

9d. Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental	Vote <b>against</b> proposals to change a fund's fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.	Same as SRI
9e. Distribution Agreements	Votes on distribution agreements should be evaluated on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis, considering the following factors: (i) Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives; (ii) The proposed distributor's reputation and past performance; (iii) The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; and (iv) The terms of the agreement.	Same as SRI
9f. Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares	Same as SRI
9g. Convert Closed-End Fund to Open-End Fund	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on shareholder proposals to convert a closed-end fund to an open-end fund, considering the following factors: (i) Past performance as a closed-end fund; (ii) Market in which the fund invests; (iii) Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and (iv) Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.	Same as SRI
9h. Proxy Contests	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proxy contests.	Same as SRI
9i. Preferred Stock Proposals	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares.	Same as SRI
9j. Mergers	Vote case-by-case on merger proposals.	Same as SRI
9k. Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	<ul> <li>Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:</li> <li>The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date that is less than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;</li> <li>A majority of the independent directors who have no financial interest in the sale have made a determination as to whether such sale would be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders prior to selling shares below NAV;and</li> <li>The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either: <ul> <li>Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or</li> <li>Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholder.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Same as SRI
9I. Change in Fund's Subclassification	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on changes in a fund's sub-classification, considering the following factors: (i) potential competitiveness, (ii) current and potential returns, (iii) risk of concentration, and (iv) consolidation in target industry.	Same as SRI
9m. Change in the Domicile of a Fund	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on re-incorporations, considering the following factors: (i) regulations of both states; (ii) required fundamental policies of both states; (iii) the increased flexibility available	Same as SRI
9n. Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors: (i) strategies employed to salvage the company, (ii) the fund's past performance, (iii) the terms of the liquidation.	Same as SRI

9o. Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	Vote <b>against</b> proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate sub advisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one sub adviser.	Same as SRI
9p. Name Change Proposals	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on name change proposals, considering the following factors: (i) political/economic changes in the target market, (ii) consolidation in the target market, and (iii) current asset composition.	Same as SRI
9q. 1940 Act Policies	Vote <b>case-by-case</b> on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors: (i) potential competitiveness, (ii) regulatory developments, (iii) current and potential returns, and (iv) current and potential risk.	Same as SRI
	Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.	Same as SRI